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Global Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Trade with
Complete Specialization
Summary
The paper develops a model in which a country with better technology for abatement of
Green House Gas (GHG) emission (the North) commits to an international protocol to
keep the global GHG emission within a specified limit while it helps the mitigation
effort in the other country (the South) with unconditional transfer of abatement
technology. It finds out in the autarkic (‘no trade’) equilibrium the technology transfer
offer from the North is always accepted by the South. The North may offer either a
partial or a complete technology transfer. If partial technology transfer is offered it finds
out the determinants of the extent of technology transfer. Then it compares the autarkic
equilibrium with equilibrium where trade with complete specialization occurs and finds
out that trade limits the scope of technology transfer as an instrument for mitigation of
global GHG emission.
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1. Introduction
Keeping global pollution within the limit has recently been a major cause of
concern around the world. Global pollution is a public ‘bad’, which adversely affects
all the countries around the world through incidents like global climate change with
grave implications for their economies. So, the countries have been deliberating
among themselves for quite sometimes now on the way to reduce the global pollution
to prevent global climate change. The Kyoto protocol had been a landmark agreement
in this initiative. The Protocol sets distinct GHG emission targets and tries - by means
of its flexible mechanisms - to distribute the burden of GHG emission mitigation
more equitably and efficiently among countries. The countries in the North with the
history of high emissions along with high national income and high rank in the
Human Development Index (HDI) are slated to make commitments to stabilize the
global pollution at a particular level. The North can fulfil its commitment either by
controlling its own emission level or by helping mitigation in the South. It is argued
that transfers from the North to the South, which target mitigation serves the objective
of equity as the transfer flows from the rich countries to the poor countries. It also
serves the objective of efficiency. Since the south possesses relatively inefficient
technology for abatement and the North is already in possession of a better
technology for abatement, the North can abate relatively less on its own without
sacrificing its production by exploiting cheaper abatement options in the South2. The
Climate Convention also stresses on transfer from the North to the South to help the
South to adapt with the reality of climate change. As a part of the adaptation funding,3
a significant amount has already been spent in countries like India and China to make
them aware of the danger of climate change. Consequently, though the countries in
the South did not make any formal commitment in Kyoto, they have also joined the
global effort in the GHG emission reduction by design of suitable regulations to
control GHG emission and by formation of institutions like Pollution Control Boards.
2

See GTZ (2004) for details. For a theoretical model explaining the transfers with the objectives of equity
and efficiency see Caplan, Cornes and Silva (2003).
3
Here we refer to adaptation of climate friendly technologies to mitigate climate change. We therefore do
not refer to adaptation to ongoing climate change.

3
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Transfers from the North to the South play a major role in the global
effort in GHG emission reduction. Transfers can take different forms: it can either be
a financial transfer or a technology transfer. Schelling (1991) proposed a carbon tax
in the North to finance abatement activities in the South. However, in this paper we
focus on the issue of technology transfer, which in recent times became an important
part of the international agreements defining the role of the North in the abatement
effort in the South. Technology transfer from the North to the South played an
important role in the talk about Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a part of
Kyoto protocol. It also played an important role in the recent Asia-Pacific Partnership
on Clean Development and Climate4 signed by Australia, China, India, Japan,
Republic of Korea and the United States in 2005. In this paper we focus on the role of
technology transfer for abatement purpose in the reduction of GHG emission.
Specifically, we explore the determinants of the extent of technology transfer where
the North makes a commitment to stabilize the global GHG emission to a limit and
South does not make any such explicit commitment. Then, we also ask the question if
the trade in commodities restricts the role of technology transfer.
We construct a theoretical framework in this paper where first we
consider the no-trade (“autarkic”) situation and then we consider the trade in
commodities, in which the country with better abatement technology (the North)
specializes in production of the non-polluting commodity and the other country (the
South) specializes in the production of the polluting commodity. We find in trade
situation, there is a possibility that the North refuses to transfer its better technology
at all as it fears an increase in global GHG emission as a result of the transfer.
However, if it decides to transfer, it transfers the complete technology. This is unlike
the autarkic situation in which it is always inclined to transfer the technology.
However, in autarky it may decide to transfer only a part of its technology or an old
4

On 28 July 2005 Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and the United States announced the
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate at an Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum meeting. The Partnership was finally launched on January 12 2006 at the
Partnership's inaugural Ministerial meeting in Sydney. The ministers agreed on a Charter, Communique
and Work Plan that outline a new model to address climate change, energy security and air pollution. The
members of this partnership account for more than 50% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions. Unlike
the Kyoto Protocol, this agreement allows member countries to set their goals for reducing emissions
individually, with no mandatory enforcement mechanism.

4
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vintage of its stock of technologies. We find the determinants of equilibrium extent of
technology transfer from the North. In trade situation, the South that always accepts
the transfer offer in the autarkic situation may refuse to accept the offer. We argue
this happens because it suffers from the adverse ‘terms of trade’ effect due to
technology transfer. We find the precise condition under which the technology
transfer takes place in trade situation. Here we observe that the commodity trade not
only restricts the scope of technology transfer but also makes the fulfilment of the aim
of stabilizing the global emission level uncertain even if the complete technology is
transferred to the South.
The scope of this paper is somewhat unique in the literature and the
results provide new insights. It deals with the issue of technology transfer and trade
when the North commits to a defined limit of the global GHG emission and
characterizes the equilibrium. There are some papers in the literature like Stranlund
(1996), Scheffran and Pickl (2000) that deal with the issue of technology transfer
from the North to the South, but they do not consider the commitment on the part of
the North in keeping the GHG emission within a limit. They do not discuss the
commodity trade equilibrium either. The paper by Yang (1999) is very close to our
framework. Although it considers the mitigation effect of the technology transfer in
the South, as it ignores the adaptation exercise in the South, it ignores an important
effect generated by the transfer of abatement technology in the South i.e. the
expansion of the polluting industry. This affects the results of the paper. We correct
for this omission in our paper. Yang (1999) also does not consider the trade situation.
There are papers in the trade theory which deal with trade and environment5.
Copeland and Taylor (2005) analyze in a trading world the effects of commitment on
the part of the North on global pollution level. It also discusses the effects of the
pollution permit trading among the countries in the North on the same. It shows the
conventional wisdom that existed in the context of the autarkic equilibrium change
considerably as the possibility of trade is taken into account. But, though it considers
trade flows between the countries, it does not consider any kind of transfer from the
North to South as we do in this paper. Another set of papers in the literature restrict
5

See Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a recent review.

5
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themselves to the issue of technology transfer and trade; they do not deal with the
issue of GHG emission. In particular, Beladi, Jones and Marjit (1997) use a very
similar model as we develop in this paper. However, they find no conflict between
technology transfer and commodity trade. In contrast to them, in our paper as we take
into account the issue of the GHG emission we find out trade may restrict the scope
of technology transfer. Therefore, this paper explores a new area in economic
research and also makes important contribution in terms of the results it generates.
In the next section of the paper we lay out the model. The two subsections
in it consider the “autarkic” and “trade” situations. The section following concludes.

2. The Model
2.1 Autarky
We consider two countries the North and the South. The North is denoted as the ith
country and the South is denoted as the jth country. Both the countries have labor as
their only factor of production. The endowments of labor in the North and the South
are identical, given by L. The countries produce and consume two commodities 1 and
2, the amounts of which are denoted by q1 and q2. The commodity 1 does not have
any pollution component associated with its production. However, commodity 2 is an
“impure public good” that emits CO2 in the production process that adversely affects
global climate. In particular we assume 1 unit production of commodity 2 emits one
unit of CO2. The global climate change has a negative impact on the enjoyment of
private utility (from the consumption of the commodities) in each of these countries.
Therefore, each country tries to abate the pollution generated in her. But, the
abatement technology has a limitation. It can abate only ψ fraction of the 1 unit of
CO2 emitted in the production process. Therefore, it emits φ = 1 - ψ units of CO2 per
unit of production of commodity 2.

6
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The countries differ in terms of their abatement technologies in the following way.
Suppose, the amount of labor required to abate ψ units of CO2 is given by6 aψ. We
assume the North possesses more efficient technology for abatement than the South in
the sense that ψi > ψj and aψiψi < aψjψj. The fractions, φi and φj denote per unit
emissions from the countries.
The countries have identical preferences. The utility function of the North is given by:
vi = u(q1i, q2i) -

1
(φi q2i + φj q2j)2
2

(1)

and the utility function of the South is given by:
vj = u(q1j, q2j) -

1
(φi q2i + φj q2j)2
2

(2)

where u1 > 0, u2 - (φi q2i + φj q2j) φi > 0, u2 - (φi q2i + φj q2j) φj > 0, u11 < 0, u22 < 0, u12
= u21 = 0.
The countries have C.R.S technology in production of both the commodities. The
production of 1 unit of commodity 1 in the North and the South requires respectively
a1i and a1j units of labor. Similarly, the production of commodity 2 in them requires
respectively a2i and a2j units of labor. We assume, a1i < a1j and a2i < a2j so that the
North has absolute advantage in production of both the commodities. Since the
countries internalize a part of the pollution cost associated with the production of
commodity 2 through the costly abatement activity, its actual labor cost of production
in the North and the South turns out to be7 (a2i + aψiψi) and (a2j + aψjψj) respectively.
Therefore, the production possibility frontier of the North can be written as:
L = a1i q1i + (a2i + aψiψi) q2i.

(3)

Similarly, the production possibility frontier of the South can be written as:
L = a1j q1j + (a2j + aψjψj) q2j.

(4)

6

Such numbers reflect a mixture of technical knowledge (blueprints), climate and labor skills. In the
question of technology transfer we consider reasonably only the transfer of the blueprint as in Beladi, Jones
and Marjit (1997).
7
In our model we assume aψi and aψj as parameters. The governments in individual countries being aware
of the danger of GHG emission try their best to internalize the social cost of the emission from their own
countries. There are papers in the literature, which treat them as strategic variables with the countries. See
for examples the papers by Barrett (1994).

7
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We also assume, the South has comparative advantage in production of commodity 2,
which implies:
a1 j
a1i
<
.
a 2i + aψiψ i
a 2 j + aijψ j

(5)

Observe, the countries have strategic interdependence in their choice of q2i and q2j. So
it must be the case that at least a Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Suppose, the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game is given by (q2i* > 0, q2j* > 0). Then it must
satisfy the following pair of equations:
- u1
- u1

a 2i + aψiψ i
a1i
a 2 j + aψjψ j
a1 j

+ u2 = (φi q2i + φj q2j) φi

(6)

+ u2 = (φi q2i + φj q2j) φj.

(7)

While equation (6) represents the reaction function of the North, equation (7)
represents the reaction function of the South. The equilibrium consumption of
commodity 1 in the two countries q1i* and q1j* are determined from equations (3) and
(4) as q1i* =

L − (a 2i + aψiψ i )q 2i *
a1i

and q1j* =

L − (a 2 j + aψjψ j )q 2 j *
a1 j

. We also check

that at (q2i* > 0, q2j* > 0) the second order condition for utility maximization is
satisfied for each of the countries. The stability condition for the Nash equilibrium is
also satisfied. The global pollution level at the Nash equilibrium is given by:
R = φi q2i* + φj q2j*.

(8)

Observe, at the equilibrium q2i* > q2j*. This must be true because owing to the
assumption φi < φj the marginal cost of production of q2i in the North which is given
by (φi q2i + φj q2j) φi is strictly less than the marginal cost of production of q2j in the
South given by (φi q2i + φj q2j) φj.
Now, suppose the North with its better technology of abatement commits to an
international agreement by which it contemplates transferring its technology for
abatement to the South in order to restrict the global pollution level within the current
limit. The South, which receives the technology, does not commit to any output

8
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restriction. We assume, the North can choose to transfer γ ∈[
abatement technology ψi8. If γ* represents the choice γ* =

ψj
ψi

ψj
ψi

, 1] proportion of its

implies ‘no technology

transfer’ (as the South’s technology remains unchanged at ψj) and γ* = 1 implies
‘complete technology transfer’ (as the South’s technology changes to ψi) while γ*ψi
represents a general case. We also assume, the technology is transferred free of cost.
However, as the better abatement technology is transferred from the North to the
South, the South’s reaction to the North’s pollution level changes that results in a
change in the initial Nash equilibrium. The global pollution level also changes. Then,
in this situation the North’s commitment to the abovementioned international protocol
would imply, it would choose its output level in such a way that at the new
equilibrium (q2i′, q2j′) the following constraint holds:
φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ ≤ R .

(9)

As the North commits to technology transfer as well as to the above-mentioned
international protocol the nature of the game played between the countries takes the
form given below:
t =1
The North chooses
(q2i′, γ*)

t=2
The South observes (q2i′, γ*)
and chooses q2j′

Payoffs
are realized.

Observe, in this situation q2j′ depends on the choice of (q2i′, γ*) by the North. On the
other hand the choice of (q2i′, γ*) depends on the way it affects q2j′. We solve the
game applying the method of backward induction. So, we first look at the reaction of
the South to the change in the values of q2i′ and γ*.

8

If the abatement technology was indivisible, the higher value of γ would imply more updated vintage of
the stock of technology in the North with greater abatement capacity.

9
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′
∂q 2 j
Lemma 1: (i) If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ = R , then
= 0. (ii) If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi)
′
∂q 2i
′
∂q 2 j
< 0.
q2j′ < R , then
′
∂q 2i
Proof: See the appendix.
Lemma 2:

∂q 2 j

′

∂γ *

> 0.

Proof: See the appendix.
The North internalizes the behavior of the South as given by lemma 1 and 2 in its
choice of (q1i′, q2i′, γ*). The North solves the following problem: it maximizes,
vi = u(q1i, q2i) -

1
(φi q2i + (1 - γψi) q2j)2
2

(10)

by choosing (q1i′, q2i′, γ*) subject to the constraints given by equation (3), inequality
(9), and the lemmas 1 and 2. Substituting q1i′ from equation (3) into equation (10) the
problem can be rewritten as: maximization of
vi = u(

L − (a 2i + aψiψ i )q 2i
a1i

, q2i) -

1
(φi q2i + (1 - γψi) q2j)2
2

(11)

by the choice of (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) subject to the constraints:
φi q2i + (1 - γψi) q2j ≤ R

(as in inequality (9))

γ≤1
-γ≤-

(12)
ψj

(13)

ψi

and the behavior of the South given by lemmas 1 and 2. The equilibrium choice of γ*
by the North and the global pollution level at the equilibrium are characterized by the
′
γ * dq 2 j
first proposition of our model. Suppose, ε =
. Note, ε > 0 by virtue of
q 2 j dγ *
lemma 2. Then, the proposition is stated as:

10
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Proposition 1: The following situations are possible at the equilibrium: (i) the North
offers partial technology transfer when γ* =

ε
and φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ ≤
ψ i (1 + ε )

R . (ii) It offers complete technology transfer when ε >

ψi
and φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi)
1 −ψ i

q2j′ < R .
Proof: See the appendix.
As the North transfers the better technology of abatement to the South, the source of
its benefit lies in the consequent reduction of the global pollution level. If the South
receives the better technology its cost of abatement (and therefore the cost of
production) falls. As a result the production of the polluting commodity in the South
rises. Because of this, a possibility occurs such that the global pollution level
increases as a whole with a threat of reducing welfare of country i, which has
originally transferred the technology. However, if γ* =

ε
, even if its
ψ i (1 + ε )

production of the polluting commodity rises the South’s contribution to the global
pollution level remains unchanged. In this situation, depending on its preference for
commodity 2 the North either can choose its output in such a way that the global
pollution falls below the limit R , which is the current pollution level or it can choose
to maintain the pollution level at R . On the other hand, if ε >

ψi
, as the
1 −ψ i

technology is transferred the South emits more pollution in the air so that the global
pollution level rises. Therefore, the North not only transfers its complete abatement
technology but also reduces its own output of the polluting commodity to such an
extent that the global pollution at the equilibrium falls below the limit R .
In the next proposition we calculate the determinants of extent of technology transfer
in the case of partial technology transfer is offered.
Proposition 2: If the North offers partial technology transfer, as ψi rises the extent of
technology transfer falls. As ε rises the extent of technology transfer rises.
Proof: See the appendix.

11
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As we have argued above when the North offers partial technology transfer γ* =
ε
the pollution emitted by the South remains constant as the technology is
ψ i (1 + ε )
transferred. To maintain this feature of the equilibrium it is necessary for the North to
reduce the extent of technology transfer at the equilibrium if it possesses a better
technology at the initial situation. In other words, if the North possesses a better
abatement technology it is sufficient for it to transfer a smaller part of it to keep the
pollution emitted by the South unchanged at the initial level. If the South has higher ε
that implies if the technology is transferred to it to some extent, its output of the
polluting commodity rises by a higher extent. As a result given the initial technology
level of the country it adds more to the global pollution level. To counter this
possibility and to keep the emission of the South fixed at the initial level, proposition
2 states, the North must transfer higher proportion of its better technology to the
South.
It can also be argued that the South always accepts the technology transfer offer from
the North. We note this as a separate proposition of the model as:
Proposition 3: Whenever the South receives a technology transfer offer from the
North it accepts the offer.
Proof: See the appendix.
As the technology transfer is offered by the North, the South gains on two counts.
First, as proposition 1 suggests, the global pollution level either falls or remains the
same. Second, as the better abatement technology is transferred it produces more of
the polluting commodity (from lemma 2). Since, as we assume in this paper there is a
net gain in utility associated with production of commodity 2, the overall utility level
of the country rises at the equilibrium. Therefore, proposition 1 and 3 together
suggest whenever the North offers a technology transfer, the South readily accepts it.
Now, we consider the cases where at the initial equilibrium trade is opened up
between the countries.

12
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2.2

Trade: Complete specialization

We consider the countries are small enough and competitive in the world commodity
markets for both the commodities. We denote the international terms of trade

p2
by
p1

p. We assume, at the trading equilibrium the following condition is satisfied:
a1 j
a1i
1
<
<
. Since the North has comparative advantage in
p
a 2i + aψiψ i
a 2 j + aijψ j
production of commodity 1 and the South has comparative advantage in commodity 2
(see the assumption in equation (5) above), as in the Ricardian models of trade,
country 1 completely specializes in production of commodity 1 and country 2
completely specializes in production of commodity 2. It follows from equations (3)
and (4), at the equilibrium the North produces ( q1i =
produces ( q1 j = 0, q 2 j =

a2 j

L
, q 2i = 0) and the South
a1i

L
). However, both the countries consume both the
+ aψjψ j

commodities at the international prices p1 and p2. Suppose, ( q~1i , q~2i ) represent the
consumption equilibrium at the North. Then it must satisfy the budget equation of the
country:
L
q~1i + p q~2i =
.
a1i

(14)

Similarly, the consumption equilibrium at the South, ( q~1 j , q~2 j ) must satisfy the
budget equation of the South:
q~1 j + p q~2 j = p

a2 j

L
.
+ aψjψ j

(15)

We assume both the commodities are normal commodities in terms of their
dq~2 j
dq~2i
consumption. It follows:
< 0 and
< 0. As the trade opens up and both
dp
dp
countries gain in terms of real income, it must also be true that q~2i > q2i* and q~2 j >
q2j*.

13
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The world market for commodity 2 must satisfy the following market clearing
condition:
q~2i (p) + q~2 j (p) =

a2 j

L
+ aψjψ j

(16)

which determines the international terms of trade p.
Since, now only the South produces the commodity emitting CO2 in its production the
global pollution level is given by:
R = φj q 2 j .

(17)

How does R compare with R ?
Lemma 3: R > R .
Proof: Since q 2 j =

a2 j

L
, using equation (16) into equation (17) we have:
+ aψjψ j

R = φj ( q~2i + q~2 j ).

(18)

Since q~2i > q2i*, q~2 j > q2j* and φi < φj the following must be true:
φj ( q~2i + q~2 j ) > φi q2i* + φj q2j*.
Therefore, from equations (8) and (18) the statement of the lemma follows.
Since, now the North does not produce the polluting commodity, the commitment of
the North to the international protocol to keep the global pollution level within
R translates into the North’s commitment to transfer the better abatement technology
in such a way that the global pollution level remains within the limit. Now, the North
chooses γ in an attempt to implement the following condition:
(1 - γψi) q 2 j ≤ R .

(19)

Observe, since with trade and therefore unlike in the autarkic situation the North no
longer produces the polluting commodity now it has only one instrument i.e. the
choice of γ to implement the global pollution commitment given by equation (19).
Here we are interested to know the choice of γ by the North. But, since it commits to
satisfy equation (19) before making its choice it would like to know the way the
South would like to react to its choice of γ. We denote the choice of γ by the North
as γ~ . Unlike the autarkic situation here, as γ~ changes the international terms of trade

14
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p changes. We call this ‘terms-of-trade’ effect. While taking its decision about of γ~ ,
the North also takes into account of the ‘terms of trade’ effect.
Lemma 4:

dp
< 0.
dγ~

Proof: As the technology transfer takes place equation (16) can be written as:
q~2i (p) + q~2 j (p) =

L
.
a2 j + β j

(20)

From equation (15):
dp
=dγ~

(a 2 j

dβ j
L
~
~ .
~
d
q
d
γ
d
q
2
j
+ β j ) 2 ( 2i +
)
dp
dp

Since by assumption

(21)

dβ j
dp
< 0 and the commodities are the normal commodities, ~
~
dγ
dγ

< 0.
Lemma 5:

dq 2 j
> 0.
dγ~

Proof: We know, with trade q 2 j =

a2 j

L
. With technology transfer
+ aψjψ j

q 2 j becomes:
q2 j =

L
.
a2 j + β j

Therefore,

dq 2 j
dβ j
L
=.
2
~
dγ
(a 2 j + β j ) dγ~

Since, by assumption

dβ j
dβ j
<
0,
it
follows
> 0.
dγ~
dγ~

Now, in view of the three lemmas derived above we look at the choice of γ~ by the
North. We also derive the condition under which the technology transfer offer is
accepted by the South. We state the results in the following proposition of the model.
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As we state the proposition we use the following definitions: η =

dp γ~
and ξ =
dγ~ p

dR γ~
.
dγ~ R
ψj
) if ε ≥
Proposition 4: The North refrains from technology transfer (chooses γ~ =
ψi
(q 2 j − q~2 j )
ψj
1 R2
. If
ξ η] < ε <
, the North offers complete
[
1 −ψ j
u1 pq 2 j
q2 j
1 −ψ j
ψj

technology transfer (chooses γ~ = 1) and the South accepts it.
Proof:
Observe, compared to the autarkic situation now there is a possibility that the North
refrains from technology transfer to the South. It does so if it contemplates that
technology transfer is going to raise the global pollution level further. However, if it
decides to transfer the technology at all, it opts for complete technology transfer. In
the autarkic situation there is a possibility that the North goes for partial technology
transfer, which vanishes with the trade situation. In the autarkic situation the South
used to always gain from the technology transfer. So, whenever there was a
technology transfer offer from the North, the South used to accept it. With trade this
result changes. Now although the South benefits with the technology transfer as its
production expands and the global pollution falls, but it loses as the international
terms of trade moves against it. If ε is too low the ‘terms of trade’ effect dominates
the other beneficial effects. Therefore, it refrains from accepting the technology
transfer offer. Also observe, since in trade situation the North has one instrument less
to commit to the global pollution constraint compared to the autarkic situation (it can
choose only the extent of technology transfer, not the output of the polluting
commodity), with trade there is no guarantee that the technology transfer can achieve
the global pollution constraint given by equation (19). Unlike in the autarkic situation,
despite technology transfer it may happen that the global pollution level exceeds R .
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3. Conclusions
The paper develops a model that tries to capture the possible impact of
technology transfer in the purview of international agreements like Kyoto and AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate on global climate change in
which the North, the country with better abatement technology transfers its
technology to the South such that the global GHG emission stabilizes within a
defined limit. The paper considers both the no-trade (“autarkic”) situation and the
trade situation between the North and the South. It finds out in the autarkic situation
even if the better abatement technology is transferred free of cost, at the equilibrium,
the North will always like to transfer its technology to the South. However, the
technology transfer can be either partial or complete. The South is always better off
accepting the technology. The global pollution level always remains within the
initially agreed limit. Next it introduces the possibility of trade in commodities
between these countries and finds out the outcomes are different from the autarkic
equilibrium. Because of trade, complete specialization in production occurs in both
countries: the North completely specializes in production of the non-polluting
commodity while the South specializes in the polluting commodity. In such a
situation it becomes obvious that there is a possibility that the North is better off by
not transferring its technology at all. However, if it decides to transfer the technology
it transfers it completely. The partial transfer does not occur at the equilibrium.
However, as the international terms of trade moves against the South, which receives
the technology sometimes it is better off by refusing the transfer offer. The
technology transfer in this case also cannot ensure the maintenance of the global
pollution level within the initially agreed limit. Here we observe that the commodity
trade not only restricts the scope of technology transfer but also makes the fulfilment
of the aim of stabilizing the global emission level uncertain even if the complete
technology is transferred to the South.
The model is based on a number of assumptions. It builds up on a
carefully crafted example, which brings out the contrasting results in the autarkic and
trade equilibria. Some of the assumptions we feel are realistic. Some of them are
limiting, if relaxed offer possibilities of new research.
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In this model we assume the country with better abatement technology
also has a better production technology. The better abatement technology is not only
able to abate more but also operates at lower cost. We think this assumption is
realistic. The model also assumes a particular pattern of comparative advantage
between the countries, which we again feel is realistic. The trade is modelled as a
Ricardian model because that best captures the issue of technology transfer.
Therefore, it uses only one factor of production, which is immobile between the
countries. So, it fails to capture the effect of factor mobility between the countries on
the equilibrium. The assumption of complete specialization in production is another
limiting assumption of the model. If we allow for incomplete specialization in the
country with better technology it is possible that the trade equilibrium can yield
similar features as the autarkic equilibrium. In the model, we have assumed the
technology transfer is free. Relaxing the assumption of free technology transfer eases
the burden of fulfilling the commitment on the North, but it accentuates the
possibility that there is no agreement between the countries on technology transfer
and the effort to limit the global pollution suffers a setback. In this paper we have
assumed the technology transfer takes place in a traded commodity. A possible
extension of the paper can be introduction of a non-traded commodity (like power) in
this model when the technology is transferred in this non-traded industry. However,
our guess is that this new possibility, though interesting, is expected to yield similar
results as in the current paper. Another interesting extension of this paper would be
the introduction of strategic trade instead of the trade based on perfect competition.
Here, we have not discussed if the transfer of abatement technology is the optimum
strategy available for countries with better technology to keep the global pollution
level within the limit. There could be other options like a transfer of the production
technology or a combination of the abatement and the production technologies. We
have not explored the possible answer to this question in this paper.
So, the paper brings out many interesting possibilities of research.
Checking for these unexplored possibilities remain as our future research agenda.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ = R , at (q1j′, q2j′) the objective function of
the South as given in equation (2) can be written as:
vj = u(q1j′, q2j′) -

1 2
R
2

(1a)

From equation (4) it follows:
q1j′ =

L − (a 2 j + β j )q 2 j

′
(2a)

a1 j

where βj is the new labor requirement in the South for the amount of abatement
associated with per unit of production of commodity 2; aψjψj ≤ βj ≤ aψiψi and

dβ j
dγ

<

0. Substituting the value of q1j′ from equation (11) into equation (10) and maximizing
with respect to q2j′, we find q2j′ > 0 must satisfy the following first order condition for
maximization:
- u1

a2 j + β j
a1 j

+ u2 = 0.

(3a)

′
∂q 2 j
Since q2j′ (q2i′, γ*) from equation (3a):
= 0. Therefore, the first part of the
′
∂q 2i
statement of the lemma follows.
If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ < R , at (q1j′, q2j′) the objective function of the South as given
in equation (2) can be written as:
vj = u(q1j′, q2j′) -

1
(φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′)2 .
2

(4a)

Substituting q1j′ from equation (2a) into equation (4a) and maximizing with respect to
q2j′, we find q2j′ > 0 must satisfy the following first order condition for maximization:
- u1

a2 j + β j
a1 j

+ u2 = (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′) (1 - γ*ψi).

(5a)

From (5a) we find:
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′
∂q 2 j
φ i (1 − γ *ψ i )
=
.
′
a2 j + β j 2
2
∂q 2i
u11 (
) + u 22 − (1 − γ *ψ i )
a1 j

(6a)

By the assumptions of the model γ*ψi < 1. The second order condition of
maximization implies the denominator of (6a) is negative. Therefore, from equation
′
∂q 2 j
< 0. Hence the statement of the second part of the lemma follows.
(6a)
′
∂q 2i
Proof of lemma 2. If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ = R , at (q1j′, q2j′) the objective function of
the South as given in equation (1a). The objective function can be rewritten using
equation (2a), which is maximized at q2j′ > 0. The first order condition given by
equation (3a) is satisfied at the optimum. From equation (3a) we obtain:
∂q 2 j

′

∂γ *

=

1 dβ j
′
[aij u1 − (a 2 j + β j )u11 q 2 j ]
2
a1 j dγ *
u11 (

a2 j + β j
a1 j

.

(7a)

) + u 22
2

The numerator of the term on the R.H.S of equation (7a) is negative as u1 > 0,

dβ j
dγ *

<

0 and u11 < 0. The denominator is also negative by the second order condition of
maximization, which is satisfied due to the assumptions u11 < 0, u22 < 0. Therefore,
∂q 2 j

′

∂γ *

> 0.

If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ < R , at (q1j′, q2j′) the objective function of the South as given
in equation (4a). Substituting q1j′ from equation (2a) into equation (4a) and
maximizing with respect to q2j′, we find q2j′ > 0 must satisfy the first order condition
for maximization given by (5a).
From (5a) we find:
∂q 2 j

′

∂γ *

=

1 dβ j
′
′
[aij u1 − (a 2 j + β j )u11 q 2 j ] − ψ i R − (1 − γ *ψ i )ψ i q 2 j
2
a1 j dγ *
u11 (

a2 j + β j
a1 j

) + u 22 − (1 − γ *ψ i )
2

(8a)

2
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where, R = φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′. Given the assumptions of the model, it follows
from equation (8a)

∂q 2 j

′

∂γ *

> 0. Hence we prove the statement of the lemma.

Proof of Proposition 1. Given the North’s problem described above we can write the
corresponding Lagrange function for optimization as:
Z=u(

L − (a 2i + aψiψ i )q 2i
a1i

, q2i) -

1
(φi q2i + (1 - γψi) q2j)2
2

+ λ1 ( R - φi q2i - (1 - γψi) q2j) + λ2 (1 - γ) + λ3 ( -

ψj
ψi

+ γ)

(9a)

which is maximized with respect to (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0, λ1* ≥ 0, λ2* ≥ 0 , λ3* ≥ 0) where
λ1, λ2 and λ3 are Lagrange multipliers.
From equation (9a) we derive:
′
∂q 2 j
a 2i + aψiψ i
∂Z
= - u1
+ u2 – (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′)(φi + (1 - γ*ψi)
)
′
∂q 2i
a1i
∂q1 j
- λ1*φi - λ1*(1 - γ*ψi)

∂q 2 j
∂q1 j

′
′

(10a)

(1 − γ *ψ i ) γ *ψ i
∂Z
= q2j′
- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ + λ1*)
(
∂γ
γ*
1 − γ *ψ i
- λ2* + λ3*

(11a)

∂Z
= R - φi q2i′ - (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′
∂λ1

(12a)

∂Z
= 1 -γ*
∂λ 2

(13a)

ψj
∂Z
=+ γ*.
∂λ3
ψi

(14a)
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Case 1: We assume,

∂Z
> 0 i.e. R > φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a);
∂λ1

ψj
∂Z
∂Z
> 0 and
> 0 i.e. γ* ∈ (
, 1) from equations (13a) and (14a).
∂λ 2
∂λ3
ψi
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* = λ2* = λ3* = 0.
This implies from equations (10a) and (11a) at (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following
equations must be satisfied:
-u1

a 2i + aψiψ i
a1i

+ u2 – (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′)(φi + (1 - γ*ψi)

∂q 2 j
∂q1 j

′
′

)=0

and
(1 − γ *ψ i ) γ *ψ i
- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ ) = 0.
(
γ*
1 − γ *ψ i

q2j′

From the assumptions of the model, equation (15a) implies:
in turn implies at the equilibrium it must be true that: γ* =
Case 2: We assume,

(15a)
γ *ψ i
- ε = 0, which
1 − γ *ψ i

ε
.
ψ i (1 + ε )

∂Z
= 0 i.e. R = φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a);
∂λ1

ψj
∂Z
∂Z
, 1) from equations (13a) and (14a).
> 0 and
> 0 i.e. γ* ∈ (
ψi
∂λ 2
∂λ3
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* > 0 and λ2* = λ3*
= 0.
We also know from lemma 1,

∂q 2 j
∂q1 j

′
′

= 0 if φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ = R . These imply

from equations (10a) and (11a) at (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following equations must be
satisfied:
-u1

a 2i + aψiψ i
a1i

+ u2 – (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′)φi - λ1*φi = 0

and
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(1 − γ *ψ i ) γ *ψ i
- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ + λ1*) = 0.
(
γ*
1 − γ *ψ i

q2j′

Equation (16a) is true for γ* =

(16a)

ε
.
ψ i (1 + ε )

We check at (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the constraint qualification condition: φi dq2i ≤ 0 also
holds.
Case 3: We assume,

∂Z
= 0 i.e. R = φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a);
∂λ1

ψj
∂Z
∂Z
= 0 and
> 0 i.e.
< γ* = 1 from equations (13a) and (14a).
∂λ 2
∂λ3
ψi
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* > 0 and λ2* > 0
and λ3* = 0.
We also know from lemma 1,

∂q 2 j
∂q1 j

′
′

= 0 if φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ = R . These imply

from equations (10a) and (11a) at (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following equations must be
satisfied:
-u1

a 2i + aψiψ i
a1i

+ u2 – (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′)φi - λ1*φi = 0

and
q2j′

(1 − γ *ψ i ) γ *ψ i
(
- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ + λ1*) - λ2* = 0.
γ*
1 − γ *ψ i

Equation (17a) is true for
out to be

(17a)

γ *ψ i
> ε. Since in this case γ* = 1, the condition turns
1 − γ *ψ i

ψi
> ε.
1 −ψ i

Here, the conditions for constraint qualifications are:
φi dq2i + (1 - ψi) q2j′ (ε -

ψi
) dγ ≤ 0 and dγ ≤ 0, which are not satisfied at (q2j′ > 0,
1 −ψ i

γ* = 1). Therefore, this case does not offer a solution to the North’s maximization
problem.
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Case 4: We assume,

∂Z
= 0 i.e. R = φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a);
∂λ1

ψj
∂Z
∂Z
> 0 and
= 0 i.e.
= γ* < 1 from equations (13a) and (14a).
∂λ 2
∂λ3
ψi
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* > 0 and λ2* = 0
and λ3* > 0.
We also know from lemma 1,

∂q 2 j
∂q1 j

′
′

= 0 if φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ = R . These imply

from equations (10a) and (11a) at (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following equations must be
satisfied:
-u1

a 2i + aψiψ i
a1i

+ u2 – (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′)φi - λ1*φi = 0

and
q2j′

(1 − γ *ψ i ) γ *ψ i
- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ + λ1*) + λ3* = 0.
(
γ*
1 − γ *ψ i

Equation (18a) is true for

turns out to be

ψj
1 −ψ j

(18a)

ψj
γ *ψ i
< ε. Since in this case γ* =
, the condition
ψi
1 − γ *ψ i

< ε.

Here, the conditions for constraint qualifications are:
φi dq2i + (1 - ψi) q2j′ (ε γ* =

ψj
ψi

ψj
1 −ψ j

) dγ ≤ 0 and dγ ≤ 0, which are not satisfied at (q2j′ > 0,

). Therefore, this case does not offer a solution to the North’s maximization

problem.
Case 5: We assume,

∂Z
> 0 i.e. R > φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a);
∂λ1

ψj
∂Z
∂Z
= 0 and
> 0 i.e.
< γ* = 1 from equations (13a) and (14a).
∂λ 2
∂λ3
ψi

24
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper17

24

Rübbelke and Mukherjee: Global Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Trade with Co

Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* = 0 and λ2* > 0
and λ3* = 0.
This implies from equations (10a) and (11a) at (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following
equations must be satisfied:
-u1

a 2i + aψiψ i
a1i

+ u2 – (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′) (φi + (1 - γ*ψi)

∂q 2 j
∂q1 j

′
′

)=0

and
(1 − γ *ψ i ) γ *ψ i
(
- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′) - λ2* = 0.
γ*
1 − γ *ψ i

q2j′

Equation (19a) is true for
out to be

(19a)

γ *ψ i
> ε. Since in this case γ* = 1, the condition turns
1 − γ *ψ i

ψi
> ε.
1 −ψ i

Here, the condition for constraint qualification is: dγ ≤ 0, which holds at (q2j′ > 0, γ* =
1).
Case 6: We assume,

∂Z
> 0 i.e. R > φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a);
∂λ1

ψj
∂Z
∂Z
> 0 and
= 0 i.e.
= γ* < 1 from equations (13a) and (14a).
∂λ 2
∂λ3
ψi
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* = λ2* = 0 and
λ3* > 0.
This implies from equations (10a) and (11a) at (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following
equations must be satisfied:
-u1

a 2i + aψiψ i
a1i

+ u2 – (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′) (φi + (1 - γ*ψi)

∂q 2 j
∂q1 j

′
′

)=0

and
q2j′

(1 − γ *ψ i ) γ *ψ i
(
- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′) + λ3* = 0.
γ*
1 − γ *ψ i

(20a)
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Equation (20a) is true for

turns out to be

ψj
1 −ψ j

ψj
γ *ψ i
< ε. Since in this case γ* =
, the condition
1 − γ *ψ i
ψi

< ε.

Here, the condition for constraint qualification is: dγ ≤ 0. But, it does not hold at (q2j′
> 0, γ* =

ψj
ψi

).

Hence, the statement of the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. From proposition 1, if the North offers partial technology
transfer the extent of technology transfer at the equilibrium is given by γ* =
ε
∂γ *
ε
. Clearly,
= < 0 since ε > 0 from lemma 2. Similarly,
2
ψ i (1 + ε )
∂ψ i
ψ i (1 + ε )
1
∂γ *
> 0 since ψi > 0. Hence, the statement of the proposition follows.
=
∂ε
ψ i (1 + ε ) 2
Proof of Proposition 3. From proposition 1 the following situations may occur at the
equilibrium: (i) the North offers partial technology transfer when γ* =

ε
and
ψ i (1 + ε )

φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ ≤ R . (ii) It offers complete technology transfer when ε >
ψi
and φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ < R .
1 −ψ i
If situation (i) occurs as the better abatement technology is offered the global
pollution level either remains the same or falls. Therefore, it follows from equation
(2), the South’s utility either remains the same or improves from the pollution effect.
The other part of the utility function is given by u(

L − (a 2 j + β j )q 2 j
a1 j

′
, q2j′). It can be

′
′
′
dq 2 j
dq 2 j
a2 j + β j
q 2 j dβ j
∂u
=
[- u1
+ u2] – u1
> 0 since
> 0 from
shown:
′ dγ *
∂γ *
dγ *
d
γ
*
a1 j
q1 j
lemma 2, [- u1

a2 j + β j
a1 j

+ u2] ≥ 0 from the first order conditions for q2j′ > 0 and

dβ j
dγ *
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< 0. Similar arguments can be made if situation (ii) occurs at the equilibrium.
Therefore, the South always accepts the offer for technology transfer.
Proof of Proposition 4. As the North transfers the technology to the South, the global
pollution level becomes:
R = (1 - γψi) q 2 j .
1 − γψ i
dR
ε - 1].
= ψi q 2 j [
dγ
γψ i

It follows,
At γ =

ψj
ψi

,

1 −ψ j
dR
= ψi q 2 j [
ε - 1].
dγ
ψj

(21a)

Since lemma 5 implies ε > 0 it follows from equation (21a)
Therefore, if ε ≥

ψj
1 −ψ j

ψj
dR
≥ 0 iff ε ≥
.
dγ
1 −ψ j

since the North commits to constraint (19) it refrains from

ψj
dR
technology transfer (i.e. γ~ =
is chosen). However, from equation (21a)
<0
ψi
dγ
iff ε <
If ε <

ψj
1 −ψ j
ψj
1 −ψ j

. Then, the North offers technology transfer.
, country i solves the following problem: it maximizes vi = u( q~1i , q~2i ) -

1 2
R by choosing ( q~1i , q~2i ,) subject to the budget constraint given by equation (14).
2
Using equation (14) the problem of the North can be restated as: maximization of vi =
u(

L
1 2
- p q~2i , q~2i ) R with respect to ( q~2i , γ~ ).
a1i
2

For q~2i > 0, the first order condition implies:
∂vi
= - pu1 + u2 = 0
∂q 2i

(22a)

On the other hand,
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∂vi
dq~2i
dp
dR
=
[- u1 q~2i +
(- pu1 + u2)] - R
> 0.
∂γ
dγ
dp
dγ
Since (- pu1 + u2) = 0 from equation (22a),

dp
dR
< 0 from lemma 3 and
< 0.
dγ
dγ

Therefore, it is always γ* = 1.
However, the South accepts the technology transfer offer if

dv j
dγ

> 0. With

technology transfer the South chooses ( q~1 j , q~2 j ) in such a way that it maximizes vj =
1
u( q~1 j , q~2 j ) - R2 subject to the budget constraint given by equation (15):
2
q~ + p q~ = p q .
1j

2j

2j

From the budget equation substituting q~1 j = p( q 2 j - q~2 j ) into the objective function,
we solve for the North’s problem with respect to q~2 j , which satisfies the following
first order condition:
-p u1+ u2 = 0.

(23a)

Observe, from (23a) q~2 j is a function of q 2 j which in turn is a function of γ.
Therefore,
∂v j
∂γ

= p u1

dq 2 j

+

dγ

dq~2 j dq 2 j
dq 2 j

dp
dR
[-p u1+ u2] + [ q 2 j - q~2 j ]
-R
.
dγ
dγ
dγ

(24a)

Applying equation (23a) in equation (24a) we obtain:
∂v j
∂γ

= p u1

dq 2 j

dp
dR
+ [ q 2 j - q~2 j ]
-R
.
dγ
dγ
dγ

(25a)

From equation (25a):
∂v j
∂γ

> 0 iff [p u1

dq 2 j

dp
dR
+ ( q 2 j - q~2 j )
-R
] > 0.
dγ
dγ
dγ

(q 2 j − q~2 j )
1 R2
dp
dR
~
[
The term [p u1
+ ( q2 j - q2 j )
-R
] > 0 iff ε >
ξη].
u1 pq 2 j
dγ
dγ
dγ
q2 j
dq 2 j

Therefore, the statement of the proposition follows.
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